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Abstract
Collaborative filtering recommender systems (CFRSs) are the key compo-
nents of successful e-commerce systems. Actually, CFRSs are highly vulner-
able to attacks since its openness. However, since attack size is far smaller
than that of genuine users, conventional supervised learning based detection
methods could be too “dull” to handle such imbalanced classification. In this
paper, we improve detection performance from following two aspects. First,
we extract well-designed features from user profiles based on the statistical
properties of the diverse attack models, making hard classification task be-
comes easier to perform. Then, refer to the general idea of re-scale Boosting
(RBoosting) and AdaBoost, we apply a variant of AdaBoost, called the re-
scale AdaBoost (RAdaBoost) as our detection method based on extracted
features. RAdaBoost is comparable to the optimal Boosting-type algorithm
and can effectively improve the performance in some hard scenarios. Finally,
a series of experiments on the MovieLens-100K data set are conducted to
demonstrate the outperformance of RAdaBoost comparing with some classi-
cal techniques such as SVM, kNN and AdaBoost.
Keywords: Recommender system, attack detection, imbalanced
classification, re-scale Boosting, detection rate.
IThe research was supported by the National 973 Programming (2013CB329404) and
the National Natural Science Foundation (Grant No. 11131006, 11401462 and 61221063).
∗Corresponding author: xulinshadow@gmail.com
Preprint submitted to Elsevier June 16, 2015
ar
X
iv
:1
50
6.
04
58
4v
1 
 [c
s.I
R]
  1
5 J
un
 20
15
1. Introduction
Personalization recommender systems (RSs) utilize a variety of recom-
mendation methods to suggest products that users may like, such as movies,
music, news, books and other products. Collaborative filtering recommender
systems (CFRSs) have been proved to be one of the most successful RSs used
by many e-commerce companies such as Amazon, Ringo, eBay, GroupLens
etc. [2], [3], [5], [19]. In practice, CFRSs are prone to manipulation from at-
tackers since its openness. Typically, attackers carefully inject chosen attack
profiles into CFRSs in order to bias the recommendation results to their ben-
efits, which is termed “shilling” or “profile injection” attacks. It decreases
the trustworthiness of recommendation and leads to a negative impact on
the CFRSs. Thus, constructing an effective method to defend the attackers
and remove them from the CFRSs is crucial.
Supervised learning based detection method for “shilling” or “profile in-
jection” in CFRSs is an important research direction, which regards the
detection attributions as the classification features and distinguishes attack
profiles from genuine profiles by constructed features. Actually, the attack
detection problem can be formulated as an imbalanced classification. The
number of attackers is far smaller than genuine users in CFRSs, especially
when attack size 1 is small. However, the traditional supervised learning
(i.e., SVM and kNN) based attack detection methods often inevitably have
individual weaknesses for handling this kind of issues and fail to effectively
capture the concerned attackers.
In the current paper, we aim to improve detection performance from two
aspects. Firstly, we consider the overall statistical signature of attack profiles
would differ significantly from that of genuine profiles. The difference comes
from two sources: the distribution of ratings (or items among the filler items
or selected items) and the ratings of the target items. Based on the statis-
tical properties of the diverse attack models, as many extracted features as
possible are designed and used to transform their “inputs”, distorting the
space so that the task (i.e., classification or clustering) becomes easier to
perform. Specifically, we extract as many as 18 features from user profiles
(consists of attack profiles and genuine profiles) to construct a sophisticated
features representation for each user to make it much more easily classified.
Secondly, refer to the general idea of re-scale Boosting (RBoosting) [17],
1The ratio between the number of attackers and genuine users.
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[29] and AdaBoost [9, 10], we apply a variant of Boosting algorithm, called
the re-scale AdaBoost (RAdaBoost) as our detection method based on ex-
tracted features. RBoosting is theoretically and experimentally proved to be
better than the classical Boosting algorithm [17]. Furthermore, the theoret-
ical near optimality of the numerical convergence of RBoosting among all
the variants of the Boosting-type algorithms was also specified. This means
that if the parameter is appropriately selected, RBoosting is comparable to
the optimal Boosting-type algorithm. And AdaBoost [9, 10] is one of the
most popular ensemble techniques paradigm and has been shown to be very
effective in practice in some hard scenarios [13]. Typically, AdaBoost em-
ploys re-weighted loss function for gradually increasing emphasis (or weights)
on misclassifications (i.e., concerned attackers) and can distinctly improve
the predictive performance on a difficult data set. Thus, with the help of
the re-scale operator, RAdaBoost can be used in conjunction with many
other types of learning algorithms (or weak learners) to improve the perfor-
mance in “shilling” attacks detection. Finally, a series of experiments on the
MovieLens-100K dataset are conducted to demonstrate the outperformance
(i.e., classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate) of RAdaBoost
comparing with conventional classification techniques such as SVM, kNN
and the original non-rescale AdaBoost version. The experimental results
show that RAdaBoost can effectively improve the performance.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief
introduction to the related work. In Section 3, we give a brief introduction of
attack profiles and attack models. In Section 4, our approach are described
in details. In Section 5, experimental results are reported and analyzed. In
the last section, we conclude the paper with a brief summary and prospect
the directions of future works.
2. Related work
Existing work in this area have focused on detecting and preventing the
“shilling” attacks (or “profile injection” attacks). Burke et al. [3] proposed
and studied several attributions derived from user profiles for their utility in
attack detection. They employed the kNN classifier as their detection ap-
proach. But it is unsuccessful when detecting attacks with small filler size
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2. Then, Williams et al. [25], [26] tried to extract features from user pro-
files and utilized them to detect shilling attacks. They also suffered from
low detection accuracy and many genuine profiles are misclassified as attack
profiles. After that, He et al. [15] introduced the rough set theory into
shilling attacks detection by means of taking features of user profiles as the
condition attributes of the decision table. However, their method faced with
the low overall classification rate in some cases, especially for bandwagon
attack. Afterwards, Wu et al. [28] proposed a hybrid detection method to
detect shilling attacks, which combined the naive Bayesian classifiers and
augmented expectation maximization based on several selected metrics. Re-
gretfully, their technique also suffered from low F-measure [6] when the filler
size is small. Zhang et al. [30] introduced the idea of ensemble learning
for improving predictive capability in the attack detection problem. They
constructed the base-classifiers (or weaker learner) with the Support Vector
Machine (SVM) approach and then integrated them to generate a high pre-
dictive ability learner for detection. Their proposed method exhibited better
performance than some benchmarked methods. Nevertheless, it still suffered
from low precision especially when the attack size is small. In addition, the
same authors Zhang et al. [31] also proposed an online method, HHT-SVM,
to detect profile injection attacks by combining Hilbert-Huang transform
(HHT) and support vector machine (SVM). They created rating series for
each user profile based on the novelty and popularity of items in order to
provide basic data for feature extraction. The precision of their method
shown better than the benchmarked methods, but the precision significantly
decreased with the filler size increased.
Generally speaking, previous studies showed that the detection results
of “shilling” attacks is dissatisfactory and leave much to be desired, espe-
cially when the filler size or attack size is small. In the current work, we
intend to improve the detection performance from two aspects. First, we
introduce more well-designed features to depict the distinction between at-
tack profiles and genuine profiles to make hard classification task (i.e., with
small filler size and attack size) becomes easier to perform. Secondly, in
view of conventional classification techniques could be inadequate to handle
such imbalanced classification, particularly when the attack size is small, we
2The ratio between the number of items rated by user u and the number of entire items
in the recommender system.
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applied a variant of AdaBoost algorithm, called the re-scale AdaBoost (RAd-
aBoost) as our detection method. RAdaBoost gradually increases emphasis
on the concerned attacks and can distinctly improve the performance for the
imbalanced classification task.
3. Attack profiles and attack models
The attackers have different attack intents to bias the recommendation
results for their benefits. In the literature, “shilling” attacks are classified
into two ways: nuke attack and push attack [3], [12], [25]. In nuke attacks,
attackers demote the target items by rating the lowest score, whereas in push
attacks, attackers promote the target items by rating the highest score. In
order to effectively “nuke” or “push” a target item, the attacker should clearly
know the form of the attack profiles. The general form of attack profiles is
shown in Table 1. The details of the four sets of items are described as
follows:
IT : A set of target items with singleton or multiple items, called single-
target attack or multi-target attack. The rating is γ(iTj ), generally rated the
maximum or minimum value in the entire profiles.
IS: The set of selected items with specified rating by the function σ(i
S
k )
[33];
IF : A set of filler items, received randomly items with random assigned
ratings ρ(iFl );
IN : A set of items with no ratings;
In the present work, we utilize 14 attack models to generate attack pro-
files. The involved attack profiles and corresponding explanations are listed
in Table 2. The details of these attack models are described as follows:
1) Random attack: IS = φ and ρ(i) ∼ N(r, σ2) [33].
2) Average attack: IS = φ and ρ(i) ∼ N(ri, σi2) [33].
Table 1: General form of attack profiles.
IT IS IF IN
iT1 ... i
T
j i
S
1 ... i
S
k i
F
1 ... i
F
l i
N
1 ... i
N
v
γ(iT1 ) ... γ(i
T
j ) σ(i
S
1 ) ... σ(i
S
k ) ρ(i
F
1 ) ... ρ(i
F
l ) null ... null
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Table 2: Attack models summary.
Attack
Models
IS IF
IN
IT
push/nukeItems Rating Items Rating
Random null randomly chosen
normal dist around
system mean.
null rmax/rmin
Average null randomly chosen
normal dist around
item mean.
null rmax/rmin
Bandwagon (average) popular items rmax/rmin randomly chosen
normal dist around
item mean.
null rmax/rmin
Bandwagon (random) popular items rmax/rmin randomly chosen
normal dist around
system mean.
null rmax/rmin
Segment segmented items rmax/rmin randomly chosen rmin/rmax null rmax/rmin
Reverse Bandwagon unpopular items rmin/rmax randomly chosen system mean null rmax/rmin
Love/Hate null randomly chosen rmin/rmax null rmax/rmin
AOP null
x-% popular items, ratings set with
normal dist around item mean.
null rmax/rmin
PIA-AS
power items, ratings set with normal
dist around item mean.
null null rmax/rmin
PIA-ID
power items, ratings set with normal
dist around item mean.
null null rmax/rmin
PIA-NR
power items, ratings set with normal
dist around item mean.
null null rmax/rmin
PUA-AS
copy ratings and items from power
user profiles.
null null rmax/rmin
PUA-ID
copy ratings and items from power
user profiles.
null null rmax/rmin
PUA-NR
copy ratings and items from power
user profiles.
null null rmax/rmin
3) Bandwagon (average) attack: IS contains a set of popular items. And
then, we use these items as IS, σ(i) = rmax/rmin (push/nuke) and ρ(i) ∼
N(ri, σi
2) [27].
4) Bandwagon (random) attack: IS contains a set of popular items, σ(i) =
rmax/rmin (push/nuke) and ρ(i) ∼ N(r, σ2) [27].
5) Segment attack: IS contains a set of segmented items. And then, we
use these items as IS, σ(i) = rmax/rmin (push/nuke) and ρ(i) = rmin/rmax
(push/nuke) [12].
6) Reverse Bandwagon attack: IS contains a set of unpopular items,
σ(i) = rmin/rmax (push/nuke) and ρ(i) ∼ N(r, σ2) [12].
7) Love/Hate attack: IS = φ and ρ(i) = rmin/rmax (push/nuke) [12].
8) AOP attack: A simple and effective strategy to obfuscate the Average
attack is to choose filler items with equal probability from the top x% of
most popular items rather than from the entire collection of items [22].
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9) PIA-AS attack: The top-N items with the highest aggregate similarity
(AS) scores become the selected set of power items. This method requires at
least 5 users who have rated the same item i and item j [22].
10) PIA-ID attack: Based on In-Degree centrality, power items partic-
ipate in the highest number of similarity neighborhoods. For each item i
compute similarity with every item j applying significance weighting
ncij
50
,
where ncij is the number of users that have rated the same items i and j,
then discard all but the top-N neighbors for each item i. Count the number
of similarity scores for each item j, and select the top-N item j’s [22].
11) PIA-NR attack: Power items are the items with the highest number
of user ratings. We select the top-N items based on the total number of user
ratings they have in their profile [22].
12) PUA-AS attack: The top 50 users with the highest Aggregate Simi-
larity scores become the selected set of power users. This method requires at
least 5 co-rated items between user u and user v and does not use significance
weighting [21].
13) PUA-ID attack: Based on the In-Degree centrality concept from so-
cial network analysis, power users are those who participate in the highest
number of neighborhoods. For each user u compute its similarity with every
other user v applying significance weighting, then discard all but the top 50
neighbors for each user u. Count the number of similarity scores for each
user v and select the top 50 user v’s [21].
14) PUA-NR attack: Power users are the users with the highest number
of ratings. We selected the top 50 users based on the total number of ratings
they have in their user profile [21].
4. Our approach
In this section, we first present an overall introduction of our approach.
Then, the two main aspects of our work including features extraction from
user profiles and RAdaBoost for attack detection are described in detail.
4.1. The framework of our approach
As shown in Figure 1, our approach consists of four phases: the phase of
constructing training dataset and test datasets, the phase of feature extrac-
tion, the phase of training classifier via RAdaBoost, and the phase of test for
generating detection results. At the phase of constructing training set and
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test sets, the data sets are constructed by attack profiles (diverse attack mod-
els are injected) and genuine profiles. Concretely, for training data set, we
use several representative attack models such as Random, Average attacks
etc. to generate mixed attack profiles. Specially, we modest increase the
number of attacks (160 attackers for each attack models) when constructing
the training data set aim to relieve the extent of imbalance in training phase
(more details in section 5). Then, we combine them with genuine profiles as
the our training data set. For test data sets, attack profiles with different
filler sizes and attack sizes are inserted into the genuine profiles to form the
test data sets (see section 5). At the phase of feature extraction, we employ
18 features (more details in the next subsection) extracted from user profiles
to characterize a feature representation (or feature vector) for each user in
both training data set and test data sets. At the phase of training, we use
RAdaBoost to train a strong composite estimator (or classifier) based on
training features. Finally, we use features retrieved from test data sets as the
input into the obtained trained estimator and generate detection results at
the phase of testing.
4.2. Feature extraction from user profiles
Previous works [3, 25, 26, 20] summarized different metrics to character-
ize the features extracted from user profiles. These features generally fall
into two types: generic and type-specific features. The generic features are
basic descriptive statistics that attempt to discriminate between attack pro-
files and genuine profiles and the type-specific features are implemented to
detect characteristics of profiles generated by specific attack models or spe-
cific signatures of attacks. In the present work, we employ 10 features from
these two types. Besides, we also employ 5 features based on the filler size
[31] and propose additional 3 new features which measure the distribution of
specific rating such as mean rating, maximum rating and minimum rating in
filler items for each user.
4.2.1. Generic features
Attack profiles usually have high deviation from the mean value for the
target items and low deviation from the mean value for remaining items.
Thus, generic features such as RDMA, WDMA etc. are often used to measure
the deviation of rating for user profiles [3, 25, 26, 34].
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Figure 1: The framework of our approach.
Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement (RDMA):
RDMAu =
∑Nu
i=0
|ru,i−ri|
NRi
Nu
(4.1)
where Nu is the number of ratings that user u has rated and NRi is the
number of ratings provided for item i. ru,i denotes the rating given by user
u to item i, ri denotes the mean rating of item i across all users.
Weighted Deviation from Mean Agreement (WDMA):
WDMAu =
∑Nu
i=0
|ru,i−ri|
NR2i
Nu
(4.2)
Weighted Degree of Agreement (WDA):
WDAu =
Nu∑
i=0
|ru,i − ri|
NRi
(4.3)
Length Variance (LengthVar):
LengthV aru =
|nu − n|∑
k∈U (nk − n)2
(4.4)
where nu is the total number of ratings in the system for user u. U is the
total number of users in the system. n is the average length of a profile in
the system.
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4.2.2. Type-specific features
Model-based methods assume that we have some prior knowledge about
the attack models. Based on an assumed model, ratings can be automatically
divided into filler items and selected items [3, 25, 26, 34]. Therefore, the
measurements such as MeanVar, FMTD etc. can be calculated from each
subset to measure the authenticity of profiles.
Mean Variance (MeanVar):
MeanV aru =
∑
j∈Pu,F (ru,j − ru)
2
|Pu,F | (4.5)
where Pu,F is the rest of the profile: Pu−Pu,T , Pu,T = {i ∈ Pu, such that ru,i =
rmax} (or rmin for nuke attack), Pu is the profile of user u.
Filler Mean Target Difference (FMTD):
FMTDu =
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈Pu,T ru,i
|Pu,T | −
∑
k∈Pu,F ru,k
|Pu,F |
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.6)
Target Model Focus (TMF):
TMFu = max
j∈PT
Fj (4.7)
where Fi = (
∑
u∈U φu,i)/(
∑
u∈U |Pu,T |), and φu,i is 1 if i ∈ Pu,T , 0 otherwise.
PT denotes the item set of potential targets [26].
Filler Mean Variance (FMV):
FMVu =
1
|UFmu |
∑
i∈UFmu
(ru,i − ri)2 (4.8)
where UFmu is the partition of the profile of user u hypothesized to be the set of
filler items F by model m.
∣∣UFmu ∣∣ is the number of items in the hypothesized
filler partition of profile Pu by model m.
Filler Mean Difference (FMD):
FMDu =
1
|Uu|
|Uu|∑
i=1
|ru,i − ri| (4.9)
where Uu is the partition of the profiles of user u. |Uu| is the number of the
profiles of user u.
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Filler Average Correlation (FAC):
FACu =
∑
i∈Iu (ru,i − ri)√∑
i∈Iu (ru,i − ri)2
(4.10)
where Iu is the set of items rated by user u.
4.2.3. Features based on the filler size
User profiles with different number of ratings will generate different fea-
tures. Similarly, the number of rating on different types of items will also
generate different features. Such as FSTI, FSPI etc. [31].
Filler Size with Total Items (FSTI): The ratio between the number of
items rated by user u and the number of entire items in the recommender
system [31].
FSTIu =
∑|I|
i=1O(ru,i)
|I| (4.11)
where I is the set of items in the system. |I| denotes the total number of
items in the system. O(ru,i) is 1 if user u rated item i, 0 otherwise.
Filler Size with Popular Items (FSPI): The ratio between the number of
popular items rated by user u and the number of entire popular items in the
recommender system [31].
FSPIu =
∑K
i=1O(ru,i)
K
(4.12)
where K denotes the boundary point of popular items and unpopular items.
Filler Size with Popular Items in Itself (FSPII): The ratio between the
number of popular items rated by user u and the number of entire items
rated by user u [31].
FSPIIu =
∑K
i=1O(ru,i)∑|I|
j=1O(ru,j)
(4.13)
Filler Size with Unpopular Items (FSUI): The ratio between the number
of unpopular items rated by user u and the number of entire unpopular items
in the recommender system [31].
FSUIu =
∑|I|
i=1O(ru,i)
|I| −K (4.14)
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Filler Size with Unpopular Items in Itself (FSUII): The ratio between the
number of unpopular items rated by user u and the number of entire items
rated by user u [31].
FSUIIu =
∑|I|
i=K+1O(ru,i)∑|I|
k=1O(ru,k)
(4.15)
4.2.4. Our proposed features
We propose 3 new features which focus on the number of specific ratings
(such as the maximum score, minimum score and average score) on filler or
selected items. Since attackers show different attack intents in CFRSs, the
filler or selected set of attack profiles may be filled by specific items (i.e.,
select popular items for Bandwagon (average and random) attacks, select
randomly items in the system for Random attack) with the highest score or
the lowest score or average score. Take nuke attacks for example, the selected
items or filler items are rated with maximum score in Reverse Bandwagon,
Segment and Love/Hate attacks (as shown in Table 2). Similarly, the selected
items or filler items are rated with minimum score in Bandwagon (average),
Bandwagon (random) and Segment attacks. In Random attack, the filler
items are rated with some average score (normal distribution around system
mean). Therefore, the number of specific ratings can be used to evaluate
partly the difference between genuine profiles and attack profiles.
Filler Size with Maximum Rating in Itself (FSMAXRI): The ratio between
the number of items rated by user u with maximum score and the number
of entire items rated by user u.
FSMAXRIu =
∑Iu
i=1O(ru,i = rmax)∑Iu
k=1O(ru,k)
(4.16)
where ru,i is the rating given by user u to item i, rmax is the maximum score
in the system. Iu denotes the set of items rated by user u. O(ru,i = rmax) is
1 if user u rated item i with rating rmax, 0 otherwise. O(ru,k) is 1 if user u
rated item k, 0 otherwise.
Filler Size with Minimum Rating in Itself (FSMINRI): The ratio between
the number of items rated by user u with minimum score and the number of
entire items rated by user u.
FSMINRIu =
∑|I|
i=1O(ru,i = rmin)∑|I|
k=1O(ru,k)
(4.17)
12
where rmin is the minimum score in the system. O(ru,i = rmin) is 1 if user u
rated item i with rating rmin, 0 otherwise.
Filler Size with Average Rating in Itself (FSARI): The ratio between the
number of items rated by user u with average score and the number of entire
items rated by user u.
FSARIu =
∑|I|
i=1O(ru,i = ravg)∑|I|
k=1O(ru,k)
(4.18)
where ravg is the average score in the system. O(ru,i = ravg) is 1 if user u
rated item i with rating ravg, 0 otherwise.
4.3. Re-scale AdaBoost for attack detection
After the raw user profiles are transformed to a set of sophisticated fea-
tures, an effective detection method based on these features for “shilling”
attacks is crucial. As is known, the number of attackers is usually far smaller
than genuine users in CFRSs, thus the supervised learning based attack de-
tection can be formulated as an imbalanced classification, actually. Conven-
tional supervised learning based detection method (i.e., SVM or kNN) often
inevitably have individual weaknesses for handling this kind of issues. Under
this circumstance, Boosting comes into our sights as it has been proved to
be efficient when faced with some difficult scenarios as imbalanced classifi-
cation [13]. In Boosting, weak learners are fitted iteratively to the training
data, using appropriate methods to gradually increase emphasis on obser-
vations modelled poorly by the existing collection of weak learners. More
specifically, AdaBoost apply weights to the observations (or samples), em-
phasising poorly modelled ones and gradually (or iteratively, more precisely)
strengthening the correction of misclassifications. The following Algorithm
1 interpret the main idea of AdaBoost [9].
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Algorithm 1 AdaBoost
Step 1: (Initialization): Given data {(xi, yi) : i = 1, . . . ,m}, where
x ∈ Rd and y ∈ {−1,+1}, weights {(w(1)i ) = 1m : i = 1, . . . ,m} , dictionaryDn = {g1, . . . , gn}, iteration number T and f0 ∈ span(Dn).
Step 2: Find gt ∈ Dn such that minimizes the weighted sum error
t = Pri∼w(t) [gt(xi) 6= yi] =
m∑
i=1
wi
(t)1(gt(xi)6=yi)
for misclassified samples.
Step 3: Choose
αt =
1
2
ln
(
1− t
t
)
and update weights
w
(t)
i =
w
(t−1)
i exp
−yiαtgt(xi)
Zt
for all samples, where Zt = 2[t(1− t)]1/2 is a normalization factor.
Step 4: Add to ensemble ft = ft−1 + αtgt.
Step 5: Increase t by one and repeat Step 2 and Step 3 if t < T .
From a statistical view, AdaBoost also can be viewed as a form of ”Gradi-
ent Boosting Machine” [11]. Consider a loss function in this case, a measure
that represents the loss in predictive performance due to a sub-optimal model.
Boosting is a numerical optimisation technique for minimising the loss func-
tion by adding at each step a new weak learner that best reduces (steps down
the gradient of) the loss function. Original gradient Boosting algorithm was
proved to be consistent, which can be easily deduced by applying the method
in [1] to [18, Theorem1], however, a number of studies [7, 18, 24] also showed
that its approximation rate is far slower. The numerical convergence rate of
Boosting lies in (C0t
−0.1898, C ′0t
−0.182), which is much slower than the mini-
max nonlinear approximation rate O(t−1/2). Here and hereafter, t denotes
the number of iterations, and C0, C
′
0 are absolute constants.
Recently, Lin et al. [17] and Xu et al. [29] proposed a re-scale Boosting
(RBoosting) to improve the performance of original gradient Boosting. Dif-
ferent from the aforementioned strategies that focus on controlling the step-
size of g∗t such as some existing variants like Regularized shrinkage Boosting
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[8], Regularized truncated Boosting [32], ε-Boosting [14], they cheered a novel
direction to improve the numerical convergence rate and consequently, the
generalization capability of Boosting. The core idea is that if the approxi-
mation (or learning) effect of the tth iteration is not good, then we regard ft
to be too aggressive and therefore shrink it within a certain extent. By such
an interesting modification, the optimal numerical convergence of RBoosting
can be guaranteed. This means that, RBoosting is among the almost optimal
nonlinear approximant and therefore, RBoosting may possess better learning
performance than other Boosting-type algorithms. Based on the general idea
of RBoosting, the re-scale AdaBoost (RAdaBoost) can be interpreted as the
following Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Re-scale AdaBoost
Step 1: (Initialization): Given data {(xi, yi) : i = 1, . . . ,m}, where
x ∈ Rd and y ∈ {−1,+1}, weights {(w(1)i ) = 1m : i = 1, . . . ,m} , dictionaryDn = {g1, . . . , gn}, a set of shrinkage degree {st}t∗t=1 where st = 2/(t +
u), u ∈ N, iteration number T and f0 ∈ span(Dn).
Step 2: Find gt ∈ Dn such that minimizes the weighted sum error
t = Pri∼w(t) [gt(xi) 6= yi] =
m∑
i=1
wi
(t)1(gt(xi)6=yi)
for misclassified samples.
Step 3: Choose
αt =
1
2
ln
(
1− t
t
)
and update weights
w
(t)
i =
w
(t−1)
i exp
−yiαtgt(xi)
Zt
for all samples, where Zt = 2[t(1− t)]1/2 is a normalization factor.
Step 4: Add to ensemble ft = (1− st)ft−1 + αtgt.
Step 5: Increase t by one and repeat Step 2 and Step 3 if t < T .
5. Experiments and analysis
In this part, we firstly introduce the experimental settings, including the
data sets, evaluation metrics and computational environment. Secondly, the
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impact of the extracted features are analyzed. Then, we compare the perfor-
mance of RAdaBoost with three other benchmarked methods such as SVM,
kNN and AdaBoost on diverse 4 attack detection methods to demonstrate
the outperformance of RAdaBoost. Finally, the remaining 10 types of attacks
are conducted by means of RAdaBoost to further evaluate its performance.
5.1. Experimental settings
In our experiments, we use the MovieLens-100K 3 dataset as the data set
describing the behaviors of genuine users in recommender system. MovieLens-
100K was collected by the GroupLens Research Project at the University of
Minnesota. It is the one of the most popular data sets used by researchers
and developers in the field of collaborative filtering and attack detection in
recommender systems. It consists of 100,000 ratings on 1682 movies by 943
raters and each rater had to rate at least 20 movies. All ratings are in the
form of integral values between minimum value 1 and maximum value 5.
The minimum score means the rater distastes the movie, while the maxi-
mum score means the rater enjoyed the movie. According to the information
derived from MovieLens website, the sparse ratio 4 of the rating data approx-
imates to 93.7% and the average rating of all users is around 3.53. Besides,
the Average Number of Items Rated (ANIR) by each user is approximately
7%. Attack profiles are generated according to different attack models (as
shown in Table 2). The attack profiles indicate the attackers intention that
he wishes a particular item can be rated the highest or lowest rating. In
this paper, we just detect the nuke attacks and the push attacks can be de-
tected in the analogous manner. For each attack model, we generate nuke
attack profiles according to the corresponding attack models with different
attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%, 27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%,
4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}. To ensure the rationality of the results,
the target item is randomly selected for each attack profile. In addition, for
bandwagon attacks, we select movies {50, 56, 100, 127, 174, 181, 258, 286,
288, 294} as the popular movies which are rated by more than 300 users in
the system. In segment attack, we use movies {50, 183, 185, 200, 234, 443}
as the segmented movies [16]. And for Reverse Bandwagon attack, we ran-
domly choose 10 movies as the selected movies which are rated by one user
3http://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/
4The ratio between the number of ratings and entire ratings in the rating matrix.
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in the system. For training set, we use the whole MovieLens-100K dataset to
generate a attack profiles by exploiting 7 representative known attack models
(random, average, bandwagon (average), segment, reverseBandwagon, PIA-
ID and PUA-NR) with 17.0% attack size (160 attackers) and diverse filler
sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}. And then, we combine these
7 attack datasets into MovieLens-100K dataset to construct a mixed user
profiles as our training data. Thus, the training dataset consists of 943 gen-
uine users and 1120 (160×7) attackers. For test data sets, based on the whole
MovieLens-100K dataset, we generate respectively attack profiles by exploit-
ing 14 attack models with different attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%,
22.3%, 27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}. And
then, the generated attack profiles are respectively inserted into genuine pro-
files to construct our test datasets. Therefore, we have 504 (14× 6× 6) test
datasets including 14 attack models, 6 different attack sizes and 6 different
filler sizes.
To measure the effectiveness of the proposed detection methods, we use
three metrics such as classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate
in the test sets, which are used in similar experiments [5]. Classification error
is defined as the number of misclassifications divided by the number of all
test user profiles.
classification error =
#Misclassifications
#User Profiles
(5.1)
Detection rate is defined as the number of detected attack profiles divided
by the number of attack profiles.
detection rate =
#Detection
#Attack Profiles
(5.2)
False alarm rate is the number of genuine profiles that are predicted as attack
profiles divided by the number of genuine profiles.
falsealarm rate =
#False alarm
#Genuine Profiles
(5.3)
All numerical studies are implemented using MATLAB R2014a on a Win-
dows personal computer with Core(TM) i7-3770 3.40GHz CPUs and RAM
16.00GB.
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5.2. Impact of extracted features
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Figure 2: Relationship between the number of extracted features and the
performance with respect to the filler size. Attack size is 17.0%.
Bandwagon(average) 
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Figure 3: The diagrams of clustering results with diverse feature employed,
where red nodes denote attackers and green nodes denote genuine users.
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To evaluate the impact of the extracted features, we conduct a list of
experiments in several attack models with diverse filler sizes as Figure 2
illustrated. We utilize EM (Expectation-maximization) clustering method
(Clustering results and EM clustering method were created using Weka 5) to
separate attackers from genuine users as far as possible based on 10 features
(generic and type-specific features), 15 features (additional 5 features based
on filler size) and 18 features (all aforementioned features including 3 our
proposed features), respectively, in order to analyze the relationship between
the number of extracted features and the performance with respect to the
filler size. Just as shown in Figure 2, Bandwagon (average), Segment, Reverse
Bandwagon and PIA-AS attacks are taken for examples. It is distinctly
observed from the results that the false alarm rate significantly decrease
with using more extracted features. Furthermore, we take two diagrams
to intuitively show the clustering results as shown in Figure 3 (Bandwagon
(average) and Segment attacks are taken for examples). By fixing attack
size (17.0%, 160 attackers) and filler size (13.3%, 170 items), the strikingly
clustering results illustrate that hard classification task becomes easier to
perform with more well-designed features employed.
5.3. Experimental results and analysis
First, we compare the detection performance of RAdaBoost with three
benchmarked methods such as SVM, kNN and AdaBoost on 4 test attack
profiles described above to validate the outperformance of RAdaBoost. The
details of setting of each method is described as follows:
• SVM: LibSVM and the default parameters are employed as [4] for train-
ing binary profile classifier with Prediction = +1 if classified as authentic
and Prediction = −1 if classified as attack. To classify unseen test data
sets, the trained SVM model (or classifier) in the training set are used to
determine the class label.
• kNN: Standard kNN algorithm is used as [23]. The k nearest neighbors
(k is chosen by 5-folds cross validation on the training data set) in the training
set are collected for prediction using one over Pearson correlation distance
weighting.
• AdaBoost: We utilize decision stumps (with the number of splits J = 1)
to build up the week learners for classification. The number of iterations (or
5http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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the number of stumps to be fitted) is also selected via 5-folds cross validation
on the training data set.
• RAdaBoost: For additional shrinkage degree parameter, sk = 2/(k +
u), u ∈ N, in RBoosting, we create 20 equally spaced values of u in logarith-
mic space between 1 to 106 and select the appropriate u∗ as [29]. The other
settings are the same as Boosting.
Fig.4-Fig.7 illustrate the performance surfaces of the RAdaBoost classi-
fier for the aforementioned test sets, which contain 4 attack models (take
AOP, Bandwagon (random), PIA-NR and PUA-NR attacks for examples)
with different attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%, 27.6%} and
filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}. For comparison, the
performance surfaces of SVM, kNN and AdaBoost are also presented. It can
be easily observed from these figures that, the classification error of SVM rise
with the increase of the attack size, which implies the SVM classifier could
not effectively classify and detect attacks generated by these 4 types of attack
models when the total number of attacks are far smaller than genuine users.
Although SVM can achieve fairly high classification performance within some
small attack size areas, the detection rates of SVM are also small. It shows
that the high prediction accuracy is almost produced by abundant genuine
users but fail to capture the little concerned attackers. In our 4 sets of exper-
iments, only a few bandwagon (random) attack profiles could be detected by
SVM and naturally SVM barely false alarmed. kNN essentially outperforms
SVM in our 4 types of attack detection methods with lower classification er-
ror, much more higher detection rate and pimping false alarm rate. However,
we also notice that the classification performance of kNN is still poor and it
may fail for detection within some certain attack and filler size areas. Just as
figures showed, kNN fail to detect AOP, PIA-NR attacks when the filler size
is too small and bandwagon (random) attacks when the attack size is small.
And for PUA-NR attack, kNN is just slightly better than SVM and barely
detected. For AOP attack detected by kNN, the results may indicate that
some genuine profiles are misclassified as attack profiles since a large number
of genuine profiles have the same or similar number of popular items as the
AOP attack profiles when filler size is too big and small. Compare with SVM
and kNN, Boosting significantly improve the classification performance ow-
ing to it iteratively strengthen the correction of the misclassifications. And
hence, AdaBoost further enhance detection rate with very low false alarm
rate. However, just as figures shown, although AdaBoost can effectively de-
tect attack over a wide range of attack and filler size, we also observe that its
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failure within some certain areas (i.e., AOP and PIA-NR attacks with small
attack size and high filler size, bandwagon (random) attacks with small at-
tack and filler size). Especially, AdaBoost can not effectively detect PUA-NR
attacks within a large high attack size area. As figures shown, RAdaBoost
additionally improve the classification performance of AdaBoost by imposing
a re-scale operator and consequence enhance detection rate with negligible
false alarm rate in the 4 types of attacks. So far, all the comparative ex-
perimental results illustrate that the RAdaBoost outperforms Boosting and
conventional supervised learning based detection methods including SVM
and kNN. Finally, to further evaluate the effectiveness of RAdaBoost, we
also conduct other 10 types of attacks to show the performance surfaces of
RAdaBoost just as Fig.8 illustrated. From results, we can distinctly observe
that, except for PUA-AS and PUA-ID attacks, RAdaBoost can effectively
detect all of the attacks with almost no false alarm. Although it also shows
low detection rates for some attacks with small attack and filler size. Com-
paring with previous research results [3, 26, 30], the detection performance
of RAdaBoost is more optimistic. For PUA-AS and PUA-ID attacks, which
are recently published attack models and few researchers pay close attention
to them. Just as figures shown, the RAdaBoost can not effectively detect
such attacks mainly because the present extractive features (as described in
section 4) are not enough to depict their material characteristics. Therefore,
the results indicate the adaptive new classification features are needed for
detecting such new attacks as PUA-AS, PUA-NR and PUA-ID.
6. Conclusion and further discussions
“Shilling” attacks or “profile injection” attacks are serious threats to the
collaborative filtering recommender systems (CFRSs). Since the number of
detected attackers is far smaller than genuine users. Conventional super-
vised learning based detection methods have the challenges faced with this
imbalanced classification. In the present paper, we improved the detection
performance in two directions. First, we extracted features from user profiles
based on the statistical properties of the diverse attack models to make them
much more easily classified. Then, we applied a variant of Boosting algo-
rithm, called the re-scale AdaBoost (RAdaBoost) as our detection method,
which gradually increasing emphasis on concerned attacks and could dis-
tinctly improve the predictive performance on a difficult classification task.
And all our experimental results also demonstrated the outperformance of
21
RAdaBoost in “shilling” attacks detection.
In our future work, we will explore more simpler and effective features to
characterize attack profiles from different perspectives. The existing features
based on basic description statistics and model-specific are difficult to fully
discriminate between attack profiles and genuine profiles in diverse attack
models. In addition, some features based on global calculating similarity
such as DegSim (similarity with top neighbors) are unrealistic in mass user
profiles, although they are effective to capture the concerned attack profiles.
Therefore, how to extract local and effective features from user profiles is
still an open issue.
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Figure 4: The classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate of RAd-
aBoost on different test sets in comparison with SVM, kNN and AdaBoost.
AOP attack with diverse attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%,
27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}.
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Figure 5: The classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate of RAd-
aBoost on different test sets in comparison with SVM, kNN and AdaBoost.
Bandwagon (random) attack with diverse attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%,
17.0%, 22.3%, 27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%,
16.4%}.
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Figure 6: The classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate of RAd-
aBoost on different test sets in comparison with SVM, kNN and AdaBoost.
PIA-NR attack with diverse attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%,
27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}.
25
PUA-NR
(a1) (a2) (a3)
SVM
(b1) (b2) (b3)
kNN
(c1) (c2) (c3)
AdaBoost
(d1) (d2) (d3)
RAdaBoost
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Fa
ls
e 
al
ar
m
 ra
te
Attack sizeFiller size
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
Attack sizeFiller size
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Attack sizeFiller size
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
er
ro
r
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Attack sizeFiller size
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
er
ro
r
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Attack sizeFiller size
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0.026
0.028
0.03
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
0.04
Attack sizeFiller size
Fa
ls
e 
al
ar
m
 ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Attack sizeFiller size
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
er
ro
r
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Attack sizeFiller size
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10−3
Attack sizeFiller size
Fa
ls
e 
al
ar
m
 ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10−3
Attack sizeFiller size
Fa
ls
e 
al
ar
m
 ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Attack sizeFiller size
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
1.06%
6.36%
11.66%
16.97%
22.27%
1.21%
4.24%
7.27%
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Attack sizeFiller size
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
er
ro
r
Figure 7: The classification error, detection rate and false alarm rate of RAd-
aBoost on different test sets in comparison with SVM, kNN and AdaBoost.
PUA-NR attack with diverse attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%,
27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}.
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Figure 8: The detection rate and false alarm rate of RAdaBoost in 10 different
attack models with diverse attack sizes {1.1%, 6.4%, 11.7%, 17.0%, 22.3%,
27.6%} and filler sizes {1.2%, 4.2%, 7.3%, 10.3%, 13.3%, 16.4%}.
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